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Your Korean supplier wants payment to a personal account

Updated

You have agreed terms with a Korean company, the invoice arrives, and the account holder is a person’s name rather than the business. This is the moment to stop and check — but it is not automatically fraud, and treating it that way will cost you good suppliers.

When it is entirely normal

Korean sole traders — 개인사업자 — often trade through an account in the owner’s own name. There is no legal requirement for an individual business to hold a separate business account, and for a small operation it is common practice rather than evasion.

You can tell whether you are dealing with a sole trader from the registration number itself. The middle two digits carry it: 01–79 or 90–99 means an individual, while 81, 85, 86, 87 and 88 mean a corporation. See the number structure guide.

When it is a warning sign

  • The counterparty is a corporation. A 주식회사 has a corporate account. There is rarely a good reason for its receivables to land in an individual’s.
  • The account name matches nobody — neither the company nor its registered representative.
  • The details changed mid-relationship. You paid a company account before and are now asked to pay a personal one. This is the classic shape of a compromised email thread.
  • The request arrives with urgency — a deadline, a discount that expires, a delay that will cost you. Pressure is a technique, not a coincidence.

How to ask without causing offence

A legitimate supplier will not be insulted by a payment verification question; it is routine in Korean business too. Asking in Korean signals that you are careful rather than suspicious.

입금 계좌의 예금주명이 사업자등록증의 대표자명과 동일한지 확인 부탁드립니다.

Could you confirm that the account holder’s name is the same as the representative’s name on the business registration certificate?

법인 계좌가 아닌 개인 계좌로 안내해 주신 이유를 알려주실 수 있을까요?

Could you let me know why the account provided is a personal rather than a corporate one?

The step people skip

Confirm by voice, on a number you already had — not one printed on the invoice or in the email making the request. Payment-redirection fraud works precisely because everything else is genuine: real company, real relationship, real invoice, altered account line. Email confirmation of an email request proves nothing, because the attacker is in the email.

And re-check that the business is still trading on the day you pay, not at onboarding — see paying a Korean supplier.

Confirm the business is active before the transfer.

Check a number

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